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CASE SUMMARIES

CLEAN AIR ACT
Commonwealth of Virginia v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 108 F.3d 1397
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued a final
rule under the Clean Air Act
("CAA") which required states in
the northeastern United States to
adopt the strict motor vehicle
emissions standards of California.
Petitioners, Virginia and associations representing automobile manufacturers and dealers, sought judicial review of the final rule, arguing
that it was "unsupported by the
record, contrary to the statute, and
constitutionally defective." In its
analysis of the case, the Court
scrutinized whether EPA had the
authority to force the northeastern
states to adopt the more stringent
California emission standards by
conditioning approval of revised
state implementation plans upon the
new standards.
The EPA's involvement in
this case began with the agency's
attempt to regulate and reduce
ozone levels in the "Northeast
Ozone Transport Region." Prior to
the final rule in question, each state
in the region had an implementation
plan in place to control air pollution.
However, EPA declared that all of
these state plans were inadequate to
comply with the requirements of the
CAA and all were in need of
revision. EPA then acted on the
recommendation of the "Northeast
Ozone Transport Commission" and
declared that each state in the region
was required to enact a Low
Emission Vehicle ("LEV") program

similar to the standards used in the
state of California. The California
standards are much more restrictive
than those federally mandated and
limit the amount of nitrogen that an
automobile may emit. Under the
new rule, approval of a state's
revised plan would be contingent on
the state adopting either these new
standards or a "Substitute Program," which would result in even
more restrictive measures than the
California standards.
The first issue that the Court
addressed was whether EPA actually conditioned approval of the
revised plans on the adoption of the
LEV standards. EPA argued that
the fact that a substitute program
was offered showed
that the
agency's approval was not conditional. Petitioners argued, and the
Court agreed, that the substitute
program was no alternative at all.
The substitute program required far
more restrictive means than the
California standards, and imposed
"unreasonable and impracticable
measures" on the states. EPA, in
essence, gave the states only one
viable option. The Court concluded
then that the approval of EPA was
conditional on the states adopting
the LEV standards.
The next question for the
Court was whether EPA had the
authority to condition its approval
on the states adopting means chosen
by the agency. The agency relied on
the plain language of CAA section
110 as evidence of its authority.
Particularly, EPA relied on CAA
subsection 110(k)(5), which was
added to the CAA in the 1990
amendments. This provision of
CAA authorizes EPA to require
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states to revise their state implementation plans "as necessary" to
correct inadequacies in failing to
attain or maintain national ambient
air quality standards or in failing to
mitigate adequately interstate pollution transport. Petitioners pointed
to the legislative history of the CAA
as evidence that EPA did not have
the authority it claimed to possess.
The Court agreed with Petitioners,
holding that section 11 0(k)(5) did
not authorize EPA to require states
to include control measures or a mix
of measures selected by EPA.
Instead, the Court found that the "as
necessary" language merely restricted EPA from requiring a state
to go through wholesale revision of
its entire plan.
The next question examined by the Court was whether CAA
section 184 actually did grant EPA
the authority which the Court had
concluded section I10 of the Act
did not grant the agency. Section
184 gives EPA general authority to
order states to include control
measures in their state implementation plans pursuant to recommendations by regional ozone commission
made up of states' governors. Once
again, EPA argued that the plain
language of CAA subsection
184(c)(5) required the states to
include any control measures approved by the EPA in the states'
revised plans. Virginia believed
that the entire section was unconstitutional. The Court agreed with
EPA's interpretation of the statute,
but delayed ruling on the constitutional claim until it had decided the
preceding question on EPA authority.
Finally, the Court looked to
other sections within the CAA to
determine if EPA was barred from
requiring the states to adopt the
LEV standards. Petitioners argued
that CAA section 177, when read
with CAA section 202(b)(3)(C),
provided such a bar. CAA section

MELPR

103

Vol. 5 * No. 2
202(b)(3)(C) prevents the EPA
from requiring new emission standards, before the model year 2004,
that are more restrictive than those
already provided for by federal
statute. CAA section 177 provides
that any state may enact new
emission standards if they are
identical to the California standards
and are adopted at least two years
before they are to take effect. EPA
denied that it violated the statute,
claiming that the states themselves
will decide whether or not to
impose the standards on their
citizens. The Court disagreed,
stating that EPA had attempted to
force the states into using the states'
independent authority to change the
emissions standards. The Court
pointed to legislative history that
stated that "no one will force the
State to make a judgment. It is left
up to the state." Therefore, the
Court concluded, EPA was barred
from requiring the states to change
their emission standards until the
model year 2004.
In vacating the rule in
question, the Court held that EPA
conditioned its approval of the a
state's revised implementation plan
on the particular state adopting
California's LEV standards. In
addition, the Court held that CAA
section I10 did not give the EPA
authority to condition its approval
on the state adopting control
measures chosen by the EPA. The
Court did, however, conclude that
CAA section 184 gave the EPA this
type of authority. CAA section 184
could not be used however to
circumvent CAA section 177,
which when read with CAA section
202, prevented the EPA from
prescribing new vehicle emission
standards until after the model year
2004.
-by ChristopherBertel
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CLEAN WATER ACT
Public Interest Research Group
of New Jersey, Inc., et. al. v.
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123
F.3d Ill (3d Cir. 1997).
Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey ("PIRG") and
Friends of the Earth ("FOE"), two
nonprofit environmental organizations, brought an action against
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., ("MEl")
under the Clean Water Act's citizen
suit provision, 33 U.S.C. Section
1365(a). The suit alleged that MEI
had repeatedly violated its National
Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit by
discharging excess salt, total organic carbon ("TOC"), and heated
wastewater into Wickecheoke Creek,
a body of water which flows into the
Raritan Canal and the Delaware
River. The suit was brought on
behalf of members of the two
environmental groups who fished
and recreated in the River and
The suit also alleged
Canal.
monitoring and reporting failures
by MEI.
In the United States District
Court for the District ofNew Jersey,
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment on their standing to sue.
PIRG submitted affidavits from
four members alleging decreases in
their use and enjoyment of the
waterways caused by the members'
knowledge of MEI's excess polluThese decreases in use
tion.
included lessening of nature studies
and avoiding consumption of water
taken from the Delaware River or
fish taken from the Canal or River.
The District Court found the four
affidavits sufficient to show actual
injury to members of the groups,
and thus concluded that the groups
had standing to sue. In addition to
the 123 discharge violations to
which MEI stipulated, the District
Court found 27 separate discharge

violations and issued a permanent
injunction against MEI's violation
of its permit. MEI appealed this
determination, and the Third Circuit
affirmed without opinion. The case
was then remanded to the District
Court for a penalty hearing.
At the penalty hearing, the
District Court fined MEI more than
two and a half million dollars.
During the hearing, the Court
accepted the testimony of MEI's
expert limnologists, who found that
MEI had not in fact injured
Wickecheoke Creek, but may have
actually improved oxygen and
nutrient levels through the TOC
discharges. Despite the District
Court's adoption of this evidence as
true and correct, the Court denied
MEI's motion to reconsider the
penalty and awarded PIRG and FOE
half a million dollars in attorneys'
fees. MEI appealed the decision.
MEI argued on appeal that
since its excessive discharges did
not damage the creek, PIRG lacked
standing to sue. The United States
Third Circuit Court of Appeals
divided the standing issue into three
sub-elements for appeal: whether
the "law of the case" doctrine
precluded the appellate court's
reconsideration of the standing
issue; whether the groups had
standing to sue for the discharge
violations; and whether the groups
had standing to sue for the reporting
violations.
PIRG argued that the Third
Circuit lacked authority to reconsider the case's standing issue.
PIRG based this contention on the
law of the case doctrine by which
courts must resist reviewing issues
resolved earlier to encourage consistency and judicial efficiency.
MEI countered that the evidence
presented by its expert during the
penalty hearing undermined the
District Court's decision on standing in the first phase of the litigation.
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The Third Circuit applied its own
"extraordinary circumstances" test
from Bridge v. US. Parole Com-

mission, 981 F.2d 97, 103 (3d
Cir.1992), extending the Supreme
Court's decision that courts should
not revisit issues unless "extraordinary circumstances such as where
the initial decision was clearly
incorrect and would work manifest
injustice" exist. While the Third
Circuit Court recognized the need
for judicial efficiency and consistency, it found that constitutional
standing requirements "trumped"
those policy concerns.
MEI's initial argument on
appeal was that Plaintiffs lacked
organizational standing to bring the
citizen suit because their members
suffered no actual injury. This
argument was buttressed by the
District Court's adoption of the
testimony of MEI's expert during
the penalty hearing. PIRG offered
three arguments to support its claim
of standing. First, under the Clean
Water Act, PIRG asserted that
Congress intended to grant standing
before there was clear evidence of
actual damage in order to maintain
waterways in pristine condition.
Second, Plaintiffs alleged that mere
knowledge of excess emissions
damaged members through waterway enjoyment diminution. Finally, PIRG asserted that standing
exists where a showing of possible
adverse effect is offered under the
Clean Water Act.
The Court initially set out
the constitutional requirements for
organizational standing, and proceeded to analyze PIRG's arguments in light of those requirements. The Court quickly held that
the congressional intent argument
was without merit, noting that the
Constitution's Article III case or
controversy clause limits Congress'
ability to "create private causes of
action in the absence of actual or
threatened injury."

Turning to PIRG's attempt
to establish injury, the Court found
no damage in the members'
knowledge of excess pollution.
First, the Court cited Supreme
Court precedent denying standing
to generalized public grievances
which individual plaintiffs share.
The knowledge-of-violation injury
claimed could not be distinguished
from the general public's concern
with the pollution, the Court found.
PIRG's
The Court compared
members to "concerned bystanders" with no more standing to sue
than an environmentalist on the
west coast.
Further, the Court noted
that the members' affidavits offered
no proof of injury to the River such
as increases in salinity, decreases in
fish population, or negative changes
in the River's ecosystem. Rather,
the Court emphasized, the members' complaints focused on reduced recreation and enjoymentfacts that did not support the
requirement of harm or threat of
harm. The Court interpreted the
Clean Water Act's language "may
be adversely affected" as limited by
the constitutional injury requirement in Article III requiring "threat
of imminent injury." Based on the
cold record before it, the Court
found no reasonable basis for
inferring an imminent threat to the
use and enjoyment of the creek,
canal, or river. To the contrary, the
Court noted, the record supported a
finding that the emissions, while
excessive and potentially dangerous, caused no noticeable damage to
the waterways downstream and
substantially contributed to the
ecosystem through an influx of
missing nutrients and dissolved

Agreeing with MEI, the Court found
without merit PIRG's claims that
MEI's failure to report affected
members' enjoyment of the river.
The claims alleged that members
could not determine whether to eat
fish or drink water from the river
without assessment of the pollution
levels. Finding no foundation for
standing, the Court observed no
evidence from PIRG on how, if
reported, the information would
have aided members in determining
the water's potability or the fish's
fitness of consumption. Leaving
open possible EPA or state claims,
no standing could be found to
support member claims.
Finally, the Court addressed the question of whether
Plaintiffs had standing to bring a
citizen suit for MEI's failure to
monitor and report properly.
PIRG's claims were found to lack
the damage or imminent threat of
damage required to allow members
to sue for these violations.
The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found that through applying its elaborated circumstances test
based in the Supreme Court's
analysis of the law of the case
doctrine, courts may revisit issues
previously decided where the interests of justice demand. Additionally, the Court tested PIRG's
organizational standing to sue
against the three prong test from
Hunt v. Washington State Apple

Advertising Commission, 432 U.S.
333 (1977). Finding no injury, the
Court held that under the test's
requirements, members lacked individual standing to sue, and, therefore, the organization lacked constitutional sufficiency to continue the
case. The Court was clear, without
showing individual harm, concern
oxygen.
Finally, MEI argued that over pollution emissions is insuffiwhere no standing based in damage cient to sue under the Clean Water
existed, neither did standing exist to Act.
-by RichardA. Hill
initiate claims deriving from monitoring and reporting violations.
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CERCLA
State of California v. Montrose
Chemical Corp. of California, et
al., and United States v. Montrose
Chemical Corp. of California, et.
aL, 104 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. Jan. 17,
1997).
In 1990, the United States
and the State of California each
brought action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") against Montrose
Chemical Corporation ("Montrose")
and its successor companies for
alleged harm to the environment.
The Plaintiffs sought natural resource damages and clean-up costs
under sections 9607(a)(4)(C) and
9607(a)(4), respectively. The government Plaintiffs claimed that the
release over the past few decades of
5.5 million pounds of DDT and
38,000 pounds of PCBs by Montrose
and Westinghouse Electric Corporation had harmed the marine environment in and around the San Pedro
Channel and nearby harbors of
southern California. The District
Court for the Central District of
California granted Montrose's motion for summary judgment, ruling
that the governments' actions were
barred by CERCLA's statute of
limitations, and granted Montrose's
motion in limine capping collective
damages at $50 million plus
response costs.
Under 42 U.S.C. section
9 613(g)(1), actions for natural
resource damages must be commenced within three years of the
later of two events- the date of
discovery of the harm caused by
Montrose, or the date on which the
Department of Interior ("DOI")
promulgates rules regarding natural
resource damages under CERCLA.
The statute requires that two sets of
regulations, Type A and Type B, be
promulgated by a certain date,
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however the DOI was late in its
promulgation ofType A rules. Type
A regulations concern standard
procedures for measuring damage
based upon the release of chemicals
into the environment, and Type B
regulations establish so-called "alternative protocols" for assessing
short- and long-term damage. The
issue in dispute was whether the
statute of limitations was triggered
once the first set of rules were
promulgated (the Type B rules were
promulgated over three years before
the government filed suit) or
whether it did not begin to run until
both sets of regulations were
promulgated (within the three-year
time limit).
. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, ruling that the
plain language of the statute
required that both sets of rules must
be promulgated before CERCLA's
statute of limitations begins to run.
The Court explained that when the
statutory language is not ambiguous, it will not look to extrinsic
information or legislative history to
interpret its meaning, as Montrose
requested. Since the statute, in its
delegation of rulemaking authority,
spoke of both sets of regulations
together, and since the statute of
limitations did not provide that only
one set of rules may trigger it, the
only reasonable interpretation of the
provision, the Court concluded, was
that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until both sets of
regulations are promulgated. In
support of its interpretation of the
specific language, the Court emphasized that statutes of limitation are
strictly construed to favor the
government.
Montrose, losing on
grounds of statutory interpretation,
argued in the alternative that the
statute's plain meaning may not be
what Congress intended it to mean.
Although a clear legislative intent

may overrule the plain meaning of a
statute, the Court admitted, Congress did not express a contrary
intent in this instance. Montrose
contended that when Congress
amended CERCLA's statute of
limitations in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA"), it expressed an opinion
that coastal zone Type A procedures
were not significant, and thus, the
statute should have been triggered
by the Type B rules promulgated
earlier. The Court dismissed this
argument, stating that the SARA
conference report made no distinction between Type A and B rules
and did not indicate that only one set
could trigger the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals found no legislative intent
to contravene the plain meaning of
the statute and held that the
governments' actions were not
barred by CERCLA's three-year
statute of limitations provision.
The District Court also
approved Montrose's motion in
limine, capping its total liability for
any possible environmental harm to
$50 million plus response costs.
Here again, the interpretation of
statutory language was the key
issue. Section 9607(c) limits the
amount of damages of a party
responsible for environmental harm
to $50 million per "incident
involving release" of a hazardous
substance.
The District Court
accepted Montrose's interpretation
of "incident involving release,"
which is not defined within the
statute, as a term of art that within
the legislative history means a
release at each contaminated site.
Thus, the statute would read that
damages at each contaminated site,
one in this case, are capped at $50
million plus response costs.
The Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court on this
issue as well. It ruled that because
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the term was undefined in the
statute, it should be given its
common, ordinary meaning. It
should therefore be interpreted to
mean "each occurrence or happening," or "a series of events of
relatively short duration" that can be
linked together, as according to its
ordinary dictionary definition. The
Court found that it naturally
followed that the phrase was not a
term of art, as Montrose suggested,
and even the legislative history did
not persuasively demonstrate that it
was. If it were, the Court explained,
Congress would have defined the
term within the statute as it did with
other terms, such as owner, operator, and release. The Court also
noted that one of CERCLA's
predecessor bills provided a definition of "incident" consistent with its
dictionary definition. Therefore, the
Court rejected Montrose's assertion
that comports "incident" with "contamination site" and instead adopted
the plain, ordinary meaning of the
term as an "occurrence" or "event"
involving release. It stopped short
of ruling on any amount of damages
to impose on Montrose, because of
the insufficiency of the trial record,
and remanded the issue for further
proceedings.
In the course of its appeal,
the government requested that upon
remand, the Court of Appeals
reassign the case to a different trial
judge in order to ensure an
appropriate appearance of fairness
or justice. The government asserted
that various comments made by the
district judge within the course of a
hearing, including references to the
government's environmental scientists as "pointy heads" and "socalled experts," suggested that the
judge was not fair in his deliberations. The Court of Appeals, while
acknowledging that the district
judge's comments were "not as
restrained as we would wish them to

be," refused to reassign the case,
concluding that despite his remarks,
there was no indication in the record
that his ruling was based upon his
negative opinion of environmental
science or the government.
In conclusion, the Court
held that CERCLA's statute of
limitations in section 9613(g)(1) is
not triggered until both sets of
regulations under CERCLA
rulemaking authority in section
9651(c) have been promulgated. In
addition, the Court assigned the
term "incident involving release" its
plain, dictionary meaning of "occurrence," "event," or "series of
events" relating to a release of
hazardous substances. Thus, a
responsible party could be held
liable for up to $50 million plus
response costs for each occurrence
of release regardless of the number
of contamination sites. Finally, in
refusing to reassign the case to a
different trial judge upon remand,
the Court noted that reassignment
based upon an appearance ofjustice
required more than was present
here. Comments suggesting a
negative opinion or attitude toward a
party are not enough to warrant
reassignment if there is no evidence
in the record that the judge's ruling
was based upon that opinion.

("EPA") unilateral administrative
order.
Sun was identified by the
EPA as one of the Potentially
Responsible Parties ("PRP"s) who
had transported hazardous waste to
an abandoned limestone quarry on
the bank of the Arkansas River in
Tulsa County, Oklahoma. The
quarry was operated as a landfill
from 1972 to 1976. During those
years, hazardous waste had contaminated the soil, surface water,
and ground water near the quarry.
In an effort to cleanup the
site and alleviate further possible
pollution problems, the EPA selected a remediation plan for the
landfill site. After attempts to
negotiate a consent decree failed,
the EPA issued a Unilateral
Administrative Order under Section 106 of CERCLA requiring Sun
to pay for remediation costs.
Appellants complied with the order
and performed the remediation,
which was completed by August
29, 1991. Sun's cleanup costs
totaled 6.2 million dollars. Sun
identified other parties that it
believed were responsible for
contributing hazardous waste to the
site and brought a cost recovery
action against BFI under Section
107 of CERCLA and a contribution
action under Section 113 of
-by Stephen Davis CERCLA to recover cleanup costs.
The District Court for the
Sun Company, Inc. v. Browning- Northern District of Oklahoma
Ferris, Inc., et aL, 124 F.3d 1187 granted partial summary judgment
in favor of the Respondents, BFI.
(10th Cir. 1997).
Sun Company, Inc., ("Sun') The Court ruled that Appellant, as a
brought an action for cost recovery PRP, had no cause of action under
and contribution under the Compre- Section 107 and that the limitation
hensive Environmental Response, period for Section 113 claims
Compensation, and Liability Act began running on the date Sun paid
("CERCLA") against Browning- more than its fair share of
Ferris, Inc., and other entities remediation costs. This decision
(collectively "BFI") for costs ex- effectively barred Appellant's
pended in remediation of a hazard- claims under Section 113, as most
ous waste site in compliance with an of its claims fell outside of the
Environmental Protection Agency three-year limitation period.
MELPR
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Sun argued on appeal that it
was entitled to cost recovery under
Section 107 since it did not incur
clean up costs in connection with
any civil action under either
Sections 106 or 107 of CERCLA.
Respondents contended, however,
that Sun's claim should be denied,
as a unilateral administrative order
issued by the EPA did not change
the party's status as a PRP.
The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth District determined that
Sun had no right to a cost recovery
action under Section 107 of
The fact that the
CERCLA.
government did not bring a civil
action against Sun, but instead
issued a unilateral order did not
change Sun's status as a jointly and
severally liable party. The Court
concluded that Sun's claim could
only be brought as a contribution
claim under Section 113. The
Court held that cost recovery under
Section 107 applied only to a
government entity or a party who
did not contribute to the waste.
Sun next contended that its
contribution claim under Section
113 of CERCLA should not be
barred under the three-year statute
oflimitations. Appellant argued that
the statute of limitations under
Section 113(g)(3) applied to triggering events, such as judgments or
judicially approved settlements,
which could occur only as a result of
a civil action under Section 106 or
107. An EPA unilateral administrative order, therefore, was not
subject to the three-year statute of
limitations, but to the six-year
statute of limitations under Section
113(g)(2), which covers a PRP's
initial claim for the recovery of
costs for a remedial action. Respondents argued that the language
of 113(g)(3) made it clear that
Congress desired Section 113(g)(3)
to apply to all contribution claims,
including Appellant's initial claim
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for relief
The Court of Appeals
found that Sun's contribution claim
fell within Section 113(g)(2), thus
having a six-year statute of limitations. The Court determined that in
effect there are two different types
of contribution actions under
CERCLA, both seeking to equitably apportion costs under Section
107, but governed by different
statutes of limitations. A PRP who
does not incur his or her costs as a
result of a judgment or CERCLA
settlement brings a contribution
claim that is an initial action for
relief, which is governed by the
principles of Section 113(f). The
PRP has six years from the start of
remediation to file a claim under
CERCLA Section 113(g)(2). A
PRP who incurs cleanup costs
pursuant to a civil action under
Section 106 or 107 has three years
to file such a claim.
The Court of Appeals
ruling ensures that PRPs who have
contributed to waste at a site can
recover from other PRPs when their
portion of the cleanup costs exceeds
their pro rata share. The Court
explained that such PRPs may
invoke the contribution defense
embodied in Section 113(f) of
CERCLA regardless of how their
claims evolved, and those individuals who are not PRPs may bring
their traditional cost recovery
claims under Section 107.
-by Stacy Nagel
Farmland Industries, Inc. v.
RqbIb Inuance Co, 941
S.W.2d 505, (Mo. 1997).
Farmland
Industries,
Farmer's Chemical Company, and
Union Equity Cooperative ("Farmland') brought a declaratory judgment action against Republic Insurance Company, Millers' Mutual
Insurance Association of Illinois,

the Home Insurance Company, the
House Indemnity Company, First
State Insurance Company, and
Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company ("Defendants"/"Respondents"). Farmland asserted that its
comprehensive general liability insurance policies, umbrella policies,
and other excess policies purchased
from Defendants obligated Defendants to defend and/or indemnify
Farmland's environmental liabilities which might arise from governmental actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"), as amended,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675, and
similar state environmental statutes.
CERCLA provides for
removal and remedial actions
against a party the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) determines tobe participating or has inthe
past participated in releasing hazardous substance into the environment. After determining a party's
responsibility, the EPA, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9606(a),
& 9622(a), may either clean up the
hazardous substances itself and sue
the responsible party for the cost it
incurred, obtain an injunction
requiring the responsible party to
decrease its production or its release
of the hazardous substance, or make
an agreement with the individual
entity to decrease such entity's
production or release of the
government pursued actions under
CERCLA and similar state environmental statutes, which imposed a
legal obligation on Farmland to
compensate or satisfy cost incurred
because of an abuse or damage. The
Court refused to follow the Respondents' cited precedent, stating that
the cited holding was incorrect in
limiting the term "damages" to only
monetary damages and that the facts
of the cited case were distinguishable.
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Contending that the intent
of the parties was to use the term as
it is used in the insurance context,
Respondents next argued that the
ordinary meaning of the term
"damages" in an insurance context
did not include response costs. The
Respondents again cited precedent
that stated that the term "damages"
should be defined in an insurance
context. In refusing to adopt this
argument, the Court declared that
the case upon which Respondents
relied wrongly applied Missouri
law, and that the term "damages"
should only be defined in an
insurance context when the parties
plainly intended to use the technical meaning. The Court found that
there was no evidence to support a
claim that the parties to the instant
case had such an intent. It further
stated that even in an insurance
context, the term would still
include cost occurring from equitable relief.
The Respondents also argued that it would be repetitious to
define "damages" to include both
legal and equitable relief when read
in the context of the insurance
policies. Not persuaded by this
argument, the Court stated that the
term made it clear that the
Respondents were liable to cover
both direct and consequential
losses of property damage for
which Farmland might be obligated, even though Farmland did
not sustain property damages. The
Court further noted that including
both legal and equitable relief in
the term "damages" was not
repetitious when read in the context
of the policies in question.
Declining to follow the
Respondents' argument that it
should not be liable for the
environmental response costs because it was not specifically
provided for in the policies, the
Court stated that CERCLA permits

parties to insure against the cost, and
that the ordinary meaning of the
term "damages" included relief that
was present and not present under
the law when the policy was
written-including environmental
response cost.
The Respondents also argued that Farmland assumed the
liability for response cost because
CERCLA has two different definitions under 42 U.S.C. §§
9607(a)(4)(A) & (a)(4)(C). While
the former places liability on the
party for all cost in remedial and
removal action, the latter places
liability on the party to the extent of
harm it caused to the environment.
In rejecting this argument, the Court
stated that the policies involved did
not refer to the difference between
the two definitions in CERCLA,
thus the ordinary meaning of the
term "damages" should be used.
Lastly, the Respondents
argued that since it had previously
been held that parties in an action
for response costs under CERCLA
are not entitled to jury trials, these
actions should not be classified as
actions for damages. The Court
rejected this argument by stating
that defining CERCLA claims as
either equitable or legal had no
influence in the Court's determination of the ordinary meaning of the
term "damages."
In conclusion, the Court
held that under Missouri law, the
term "damages," as used in the
Respondents' insurance policies,
made the Respondents liable to
indemnify and/or defend any environmental response costs "in without the fault of the DOE."
In response to DOE's attempt
to recycle its argument from
IndianaMichigan, the Court reaf-

firmed its decision that the DOE's
obligation was unconditional. As a
result, the Court issued a partial writ
of mandamus precluding the DOE

from excusing its own delay by
arguing that it had not yet developed
a permanent repository or interim
storage facility. The Court also
precluded the DOE from characterizing the delay as unavoidable
because of the lack of such facilities.
Finally, the Court rejected the
DOE's interpretation of the Standard Contract, which DOE argued
excused it from performance because of certain governmental acts.
The Court reasoned that Congress
created an unconditional duty to
take the SNF by the statutory
deadline and that DOE's interpretation would violate the directives of
Congress. The Court held that the
language the DOE referred to in its
interpretation of the Standard Contract was inconsistent with DOE's
statutory obligation and thus unenforceable.
-by Douglas L. McHoney

MISCELLANEOUS
Reese v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
No. 96-16507, 1997 WL 700936
(9th Cir. 1997).
Defendant Travelers Insurance
Company ("Travelers") insured
plaintiff Reese's metals reclamation
business for comprehensive general
liability between 1981 and 1985.
Reese sued the insurer for indemnity, declaration of the duty to
indemnify and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Travelers denied that the
policy's coverage required the
insurance company to defend an
action against the insured for
cleanup of environmental contamination because of a policy exclusion
for property that the insured owned,
rented or used.
Reese, as a director of the
Keystone Metal Company ("Keystone"), rented a Bakersfield, California, business site from John
Chrisman. Keystone reclaimed met-
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als from scrap material, creating
waste materials that contamijhated
the soil at the business site.
Chrisman sued Keystone and its
management for $1.9 million,
which represented the costs of site
In
cleanup and other damages.
Chrisman's action, Reese brought a
third-party complaint against
Keystone's insurer, Travelers. After originally agreeing to defend
Reese, the insurance company
withdrew coverage, concluding that
the policy terms did not include
liability for damage to property that
the insured party owned, rented or
used. Keystone rented the site from
Chrisman, so the insurance company denied any obligation to
indemnify Reese for damages that
Chrisman's action might impose on
Keystone. Travelers countered
Reese's claim with a demand for
declaration of its coverage obligations under the policy.
Upon Reese's motion for summary judgment on his declaratory
claim, the District Court granted
summary judgment sua sponte for
Travelers and denied Reese's motion, citing the owned-property
exclusion in the policy as justification for Travelers refusal to defend
Chrisman's claim. Reese appealed.
The Court first considered. the
insurer's duty to defend. The policy
language stated that coverage applied for property damage "even if
any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false or fraudulent."
The Court explained that to prevail
through summary judgment, the
insured must only establish the
potential for coverage under the
policy by comparing the policy
language to the terms of the
complaint, which Reese had done in
the third-party complaint against
Travelers. The Court cited precedent stating that the duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify,
and moved on to consider Travel-
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ers' argument that the ownedproperty exclusion precluded any
obligation to defend.
Travelers argued that the contamination was limited to the
property where Keystone conducted business and would not seep
into the groundwater supply; therefore, the owned-property exclusion
precluded coverage. Reese argued
that the policy terms required
Travelers to defend against
Christman's suit and that the
exclusion did not apply.
The Court held that the ownedproperty exclusion did not excuse
Travelers from defending Reese
against Chrisman. The Court explained that Travelers' evaluation of
the validity of Chrisman's claim
against Reese on the merits was
inappropriate and did not justify a
refusal to defend the claim. The
insurance company was obligated to
defend because Chrisman's com-

plaint alleged property damage and
groundwater contamination, which
the policy explicitly covered. The
allegation in the complaint of an act
for which Reese had coverage,
groundwater contamination, was
enough to require the insurance
policy to defend the action, whether
or not the allegation proved groundless. The Court cited A-H Plating,
Inc. v. Am. Nat '. Fire Ins. Co. (57

Cal. App. 4th 427), stating that the
insurer's unilateral determination
that the insured was not at fault did
not justify a denial of the duty to
defend under the policy.
In addition, the Court rejected
Travelers' argument that a policy
exclusion for pollution that is
"expected or intended" to result
from the policyholder's actions
justified denial of coverage. Travelers claimed that the insured expected the metals reclamation
business to produce pollution,
therefore releasing Travelers from
coverage on pollution claims. The

Court found that although the
metals reclamation business certainly produced pollution, the
complaint against Keystone did not
preclude the possibility that the
damage was caused accidentally,
which would be covered under the
general liability policy.
The Court refused to rule on the
bad faith claim. The lower Court did
not reach this issue because the
grant of summary judgment denying the duty to defend precluded
consideration of the merits of this
claim.
In conclusion, the Court held
that Travelers could not escape its
duty to defend because the claim
against Reese established the potential for liability under the policy.
The Court also held that the ownedproperty exclusion did not apply
because the complaint alleged
groundwater contamination, which
was a covered risk.
-by Becky Williams

Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 684
N.E.2d 504 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
A number of residential
landowners commenced an action
under Indiana's Underground Storage Tank Act ("IUSTA"), IND. CODE
ANN. § 13-23-1-1 to -15-4 (West
1997), to recover costs for past and
future corrective actions necessary
to abate contamination on property
formerly operated as a gas station
("subject property"). In addition,
the landowners sought to recover
attorney fees and expenses pursuant
to IUSTA. The trial court ordered
the defendants to pay reasonable
corrective action costs, totaling
$2,743,660.21, and reasonable attorney fees and expenses, totaling
$1,639,071.95. The plaintiffs and
two defendants, Shell and Union,
appealed.
In 1946, Fred Smith
("Smith") purchased the subject
property in West Point, Indiana, and
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developed the land for use as a gas
station. From 1946 to 1971, Smith
leased the property to various
parties who operated it as a "Shell"
gas station.
Smith, himself,
transported gas from the Shell Oil
Company ("Shell") bulk plant in
Lafayette, Indiana, to the subject
property using his own tank truck.
In 1971, the bulk plant began
supplying Union Oil Company
("Union") gas instead of Shell. As a
result, the lessees ceased operating
the property as a Shell station and
began operating it as a "Union 76"
gas station. Prior to his death in
1979, Smith continued transporting
gas from the Union bulk plant to the
subject property. From 1979 to
1981, the lessees continued operating the gas station on the subject
property, and a Union gas distributor transported gas to the station. In
1981, the Union 76 station discontinued its operation on the subject
property.
Sometime thereafter,
Robert Van Meter ("Van Meter")
acquired the subject property,
removed the underground fuel
tanks, and began operating Van's
Wholesale Auto Body Shop ("Van's
Body Shop") on the property.
In 1989, Richard and Kim
Meyer (the "Meyers"), who owned
a residential lot near the subject
property, noticed the odor of
petroleum in their drinking water.
The Meyers reported the odor to the
county health department, which
tested the Meyers' water for
contaminants. Lab tests revealed
the presence of benzene in concentrations of 180 parts per billion. A
few months later, the Indiana
Department of Environmental Management ("IDEM") tested residents' water throughout the Meyers'
neighborhood and discovered that
the water in the area contained
concentrations of benzene; 1,2dichloroethane; and other constituents of gasoline. Soon thereafter,

the IDEM hired a private environmental consulting firm to conduct a
study and identify the source of the
In 1992, the
contamination.
consulting firm identified the subject property as the source, and
subsequent testing on the property
revealed high concentrations of
petroleum hydrocarbons in and
around the areas previously occupied by the underground fuel tanks.
In May 1993, the Meyers
and several other residential landowners in the area filed a suit
against Shell, Union, Van Meter,
Van's Body Shop, and Smith's
widow. The complaint alleged six
counts: (I) liability under IUSTA;
(II) liability under Indiana's antidumping statute, IND. CODE ANN. §
13-7-11-6(c) (West 1997); (III)
negligence; (IV) trespass; (V)
nuisance; and (VI) strict liability for
an abnormally dangerous activity.
Originally, the plaintiffs named
Shell and Union only under Counts
III through VI but later amended the
complaint to name both companies
under Count I, as well. All parties
agreed that Count Iwas an equitable
claim and should be decided only
after a jury trial on the plaintiffs'
common law counts. Following a
trial on Counts III through VI, the
jury. returned a general verdict in
favor of defendants. The trial court
found in favor of the plaintiffs as to
Count I, and ordered the defendant
to pay reasonable corrective action
expenses and attorney fees and
expenses. The court apportioned
these fees and expenses between
Shell and Union based on the time
the gas station operated under each
name. Thus, the court ordered Shell
to pay 70 percent of the award and
ordered Union to pay 30 percent.
The plaintiffs appealed, seeking a
new trial. Shell and Union appealed
on several grounds.
Shell's and Union's challenges to the trial court's decision

regarding Count I raised several
issues on appeal. First, Shell and
Union asserted that they were not
"operators" within the meaning of
IUSTA because the issue had been
fully and fairly adjudicated before
the jury, which had decided the
issue adversely to the plaintiffs, and
collateral estoppel barred subsequent reconsideration of the same
issue under Count I. The appellate
court recited the general rule that
issue preclusion is not applicable
where matters are not expressly
adjudicated and cannot be inferred
without argument. The court noted
that, in fact, the parties had not
adjudicated IUSTA's definition of
"operator" before the jury in this
case. In addition, because the jury
rendered only a general verdict, the
court concluded that the jury may or
may not have based its decision on a
determination as to whether Shell
and Union were operators ofthe gas
station. Finally, the court invoked
the doctrine of judicial estoppel to
bar the oil companies' assertion of
collateral estoppel because such an
argument was inconsistent with the
companies' previous arguments for
removal to federal court. Consequently, the court held that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel was
inapplicable.
Second, Shell and Union
contended they were not "operators" within the meaning of IUSTA
because they had not exercised
sufficient control over the operation
of the gas station to be deemed
operators. The plaintiffs argued
that the facts sufficiently supported
the trial court's determination to the
contrary. As an initial matter, the
court noted that when a trial court's
decision is based on special
findings and conclusions, an appellate court may reverse it only if
clearly erroneous. Next, the court
determined that the statutory definition of "operator" was ambiguous.
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Consequently, the court employed
rules of statutory construction to
ascertain the term's meaning. The
court found judicial interpretations
of the term "operator" as defined
and used in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act ("CERCLA")
particularly persuasive because of
the consonant purposes of those
acts and IUSTA and because the
Indiana legislature had adapted
many of RCRA's and CERCLA's
provisions for its own use when it
enacted IUSTA. Relying on several
federal court opinions, the court
determined that the term "operator"
includes parties who possess the
authority and/or ability to control
underground storage tanks, whether
or not they actually exercise that
authority or ability. Because the oil
companies had, in the past, demonstrated their ability to control the
practices of independently owned
gas stations in various ways, the
court found that the evidence amply
supported the trial court's determination that Shell and Union were
both operators within the meaning
of IUSTA.
Third, the oil companies
argued that the plaintiffs could not
seek recovery for corrective action
expenses because in this case
because the plaintiffs were not
themselves liable for corrective
action expenses. Based on a plain
reading of the IUSTA, the express
purposes of Indiana's environmental statutes, and precedent, the court
concluded that anyone who incurs
corrective action expenses otherwise compensable under the IUSTA
may seek contribution.
Fourth, Shell challenged
the trial court's apportionment of
liability between Shell and Union
because the trial court did not give
Shell an opportunity to argue the
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issue or present evidence, the
evidence of record did not support
the trial court's allocation, and the
trial court improperly based its
allocation on a market share
liability theory. In response, the
plaintiffs argued that Indiana's
statutes expressly authorize a trial
court to consider any equitable
factors it determines are appropriate
when allocating corrective action
expenses in a contribution action
and that a trial court is entitled to
greater deference where it exercises
equitable discretion. Even so, the
appellate court held that the trial
court had abused its discretion by
failing to notify the parties that it
would be deciding the issue of
allocation in its preliminary determination of liability.
Consequently, the appellate court remanded the issue of allocation for
briefing and an evidentiary hearing
Fifth, Shell and Union
asserted that the trial court should
not have awarded contribution for
corrective action costs yet to be
incurred because such costs are
speculative and not authorized by
the IUSTA. In ruling that future
corrective action expenses are
presently recoverable, the court
again relied on a plain reading ofthe
IUSTA, as the IUSTA does. not

require that ina suit for contribution
plaintiffs must already have incurred corrective action costs. In
addition, the court noted that the oil
companies' -interpretation of the
statute was contrary to the purposes
of Indiana's environmental laws.
As a result, the court concluded that
future corrective action expenses
are recoverable in actions for
contribution under the IUSTA.
Sixth, the oil companies
challenged the trial court's inclusion of costs to monitor the future
medical conditions of the plaintiffs
as corrective action costs. Shell and
Union contended that such costs are

beyond the scope of corrective
action expenses compensable under
IUSTA. In opposition, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court's
award was appropriate and that the
appellate court must affirm because
ofthe deferential standard of review
afforded a trial court's findings and
conclusions. After reviewing the
IUSTA, the court concluded that
medical monitoring is not a
"corrective action" within the
meaning of the IUSTA. Plaintiffs
contended that medical monitoring
should be considered an "exposure
assessment," which the IUSTA
expressly provides is an appropriate
corrective action. The appellate
court disagreed with the plaintiffs
and cited several sources supporting
its conclusion, including the purposes for conducting exposure
assessments under IUSTA, the
purposes for taking corrective
actions generally, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the purpose for
exposure assessments under RCRA,
and the Conference Report on the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Consequently, the appellate court ordered
that the trial court exclude medical
monitoring costs from its award of
corrective action expenses.
Seventh, and finally, Shell
and Union urged the court to
construe the attorney's fees and
expense's provision of the IUSTA
narrowly, thereby disallowing an
award of attorney's fees for work
unrelated to a successful claim for
contribution. After considering the
language of the IUSTA and factors
commonly used to assess the
reasonableness of attorney's fees,
the court concluded that courts
should award attorney's fees only
insofar as related to a successful
IUSTA contribution claim. As a
result, fees incurred for work on
non-IUSTA claims are not com-
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pensable, although the court indicated that fees incurred for work on
successful IUSTA claims that
overlap with non-IUSTA claims
may be recovered under the statute.
Because the plaintiffs' suit had
involved both IUSTA and nonIUSTA claims, the appellate court
remanded the issue for an itemization of fees by claim.
Also related to the trial
court's award of attorney fees and
expenses, the oil companies argued
that paralegal and other miscellaneous fees are not compensable as
"attorney's fees and court costs"
under the IUSTA. The appellate
court noted that the IUSTA failed
to define the phrase "attorney's
fees and court costs." Thus, the
court resorted to the purposes of
Indiana's environmental laws and
precedent to uphold the trial court's
inclusion of paralegal and other
miscellaneous fees in its award.
The plaintiffs raised only
one issue on appeal.
They
contended that the trial court had
erroneously instructed the jury
regarding trademarks and requested
that the appellate court grant a new
trial. The appellate court held that
the instruction was not erroneous
and denied the plaintiffs' request
for a new trial.
In summary, the Indiana
Court of Appeals addressed a
number of issues related to the
plaintiffs' contribution action under the IUSTA. First, the oil
companies were unable to assert
collateral estoppel as to their status
as "operators" under the IUSTA
because the jury verdict on which
they based their argument was a
general verdict, the parties had not
adjudicated the issue before the
jury, and the argument was
inconsistent with a previous argument advanced by the oil companies. Second, Shell and Union were
operators within the meaning of the

IUSTA because they had the ability
to control the operation of the gas
station whether or not they actually
did so. Third, the plaintiffs may
recover corrective action expenses
under the IUSTA even though they
are not themselves liable for
contribution. Fourth, the trial court
abused its discretion when it failed
to notify the parties that it would be
allocating liability among the defendants in its preliminary determination of liability. Fifth, the trial
court's award of future corrective
action expenses was proper under
the IUSTA. Sixth, medical monitoring expenses do not constitute
corrective action expenses within
the meaning of the IUSTA and
cannot be recovered in a contribution action thereunder. Seventh,
courts will award attorney's fees
and court costs under the IUSTA
only insofar as those fees and costs
are incurred for work related to
successful IUSTA claims. Also,
paralegal and miscellaneous fees
are properly includable in an award
of attorney's fees under the IUSTA.
Eighth, the trial court's jury
instruction regarding trademarks
was not erroneous, and, as a result,
plaintiffs were not entitled to a new
trial.
-by Craig A. Street
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